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Abstract 
The paper presents the main characteristics of BETAMOD, a static microsimulation model that reproduces the 
Italian personal income tax (IRPEF), as well as local income taxes, namely the regional and municipal additional 
income taxes, building on a detailed reconstruction of tax legislation. With respect to the vast majority of existing 
tax microsimulation models, the peculiarities of BETAMOD concern two aspects: the inclusion of a detailed set of 
tax expenditures, and the estimation of individual-specific tax evasion rates, which account for the total 
individual income level, its composition in terms of income sources, and the geographical area of residence.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing complexity of fiscal challenges requires appropriate instruments to evaluate the 
revenue effects and the distributional consequences of specific policies. Microsimulation models, 
based on representative sample of individuals or households, take into account the heterogeneity 
of individual behavior, reproduce a part or the whole tax and benefit system of a country, regions 
or group of States (Sutherland and Figari, 2013) and are able to identify the winners and the 
losers of tax/transfer policies. Microsimulation models have become in many countries a 
standard tool for the design and the evaluation of public policies (see, among others, 
Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006; Mitton, Sutherland and Weeks, 2000). 
This paper presents a new microsimulation model, called BETAMOD, for Italian personal income 
tax (IRPEF), as well as local income taxes, namely the regional and municipal additional income 
taxes. 
BETAMOD improves on existing models1 in two ways: first, by estimating a distribution of 
individual tax evasion rates, based on total individual income level, its composition in terms of 
sources, and geographical area; second, by accounting for a detailed set of tax allowances, which 
are currently the object of fiscal policy reforms debate, at the national and international level (e.g. 
Tyson, 2014). For different reasons, the two aspects are relevant in the Italian institutional setting 
and therefore deserve particular attentions.  
Tax evasion in Italy is extremely high and various political leaders as well as a significant share of 
the public opinion seem to justify tax evaders using the argument that the tax rates are too high 
and the tax schedule too progressive. The answer to the above question depends on the 
redistributive effects of tax evasion and, more specifically, on the distinct effects that tax evasion 
may have on progressivity (vertical effect) versus horizontal equity and re-ranking (Aronson and 
Lambert, 1994). With respect to other Italian models, where tax evasion rates are assumed to be 
constant within population subgroups (e.g. by income source type, by income classes), 
BETAMOD, assigns a tax evasion rate to each individual. This allows to evaluate more accurately 
how tax evasion may alter the redistributive effect of personal income taxation, and to measure 
the horizontal, vertical and re-ranking effects, each of which is possibly altered by tax evasion.  
Over the last decade, tax expenditures in Italy have increased as a share of GDP. The Italian 
Ministry of Economy and Finance identifies 720 measures of tax expenditures that, in percent of 
                                                 
1 In the past decade several microsimulation models were developed in Italy. Models belong to the same type of  
BETAMOD are: the Siena microsimulation model (SM2) for net-gross conversion of EU-SILC income variables (Betti 
et al. 2011); the MAPP model for studying the effects of taxes and transfers (in cash and in kind) on the level of 
poverty and inequality (Baldini et al., 2011); the TABEITA model that reproduces the Italian personal income tax 
(Ceriani et. al, 2013), and the microsimulation model developed by Pellegrino et al. (2011) for the analysis of housing 
taxation. 
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GDP, account for about 10.66 (MEF, 2011). Among them, the individual income tax expenditures 
are the largest (4.84% of GDP). Because of the entailed reduction in tax revenues, and the 
induced distortions in taxpayers’ behavior, there is an increasing debate on the use of tax 
expenditures as alternative to direct expenditures (see, Burman, 2003; Burman et al., 2008; 
Poterba, 2011). Compared to current microsimulation models for Italy, BETAMOD includes all 
kind of individual income tax expenditures and allows us to estimate the distributional effects of 
all tax expenditures simultaneously and of specific tax reliefs or categories of expenditure. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and the preliminary data 
adjustments and imputations required to simulate accurately the Italian personal income taxes. 
Section 3 illustrates, in details, the process of constructing BETAMOD, focusing in particular on its 
innovative aspects. Section 4 tests the robustness of the model by comparing the baseline 
simulation of personal income tax and local income taxes with official figures provided by tax 
returns data. Finally, Section 5 provides novel distributional evidences on tax evasion and on its 
profile, as well as on individuals’ re-ranking between income classes resulting from it2.  
 
2. THE MICRO DATABASE AND RELATED IMPUTATIONS  
BETAMOD runs on the Italian national version of the Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
(IT-SILC), which represents, with a few exceptions, the micro-database currently chosen by most 
tax-benefit microsimulation models for Italy3. With respect to the alternative Survey on 
Households Income and Wealth (SHIW), IT-SILC takes the advantage of a more generous sample 
size (19,399 households in IT-SILC versus 7,951 households in SHIW), allowing to conduct 
analyses by geographical area sample; the drawback of this choice is the lack of information on 
household’s assets and tax-relevant expenditures.  
We use the cross-sectional component of IT-SILC 2011, which features a considerably larger 
sample size than the rotating longitudinal component. The interview is structured into an 
household level questionnaire, collecting information on household composition, 
accommodation, housing costs, and economic circumstances (including savings, debts, receipt of 
family-related and means-tested benefits and children’s incomes); and an individual level 
questionnaire, which is administered to all household members aged 16 years old or above. In the 
                                                 
2 Further material s provided in three Appendices. Appendix A describes the statistical matching between the IT-SILC 
dataset and the Bank of Italy's Survey on Households Income and Wealth (SHIW); Appendix B illustrates the 
methodology used for the estimation of individual tax evasion rates, and Appendix C shows the incidence of tax 
reliefs on reported income. 
3 For instance, SM2 model (Betti et al., 2011), MAPP model (Baldini et al., 2011), and the EUROMOD module for Italy 
(Sutherland and Figari, 2011) use IT-SILC data; while, TABEITA model (Ceriani et al., 2013) and the microsimulation 
model developed by Pellegrino et al. (2011) considers as input data those provided by the Bank of Italy in the Survey 
on Households Income and Wealth (SHIW). 
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individual level questionnaire, besides information on education, health and occupation, detailed 
information on individual’s income from various sources relevant for tax base assessment 
(employment, self-employment, old age and disability pensions, incapacity and disability benefits, 
rents from properties, investment income and other incomes) is covered. For income 
components subject to taxation4, the amount as net of taxes (and of social insurance 
contributions, where applicable) is collected, because net amounts are generally regarded as less 
exposed to measurement error and recall bias than gross ones. Reflecting the structure of the 
Italian fiscal system, where incomes earned in the solar year t are taxed in the following (t+1), the 
reference period in income-related questions is the previous fiscal year, that is 2010. This 
represents a mismatch with respect to demographic information, which reflects the situation of 
households at the time when the fieldwork was carried out (i.e. March and April 2011), and 
which has therefore been brought backward to 2010.  
Still, an accurate simulation of Italian personal income tax requires additional information with 
respect to IT-SILC topics coverage. Most notably, the personal income tax base includes not only 
employment and self-employment income, replacement income, profits from non-corporate 
enterprises and a marginal part of investment income, but also figurative income on immovable 
properties, valued as cadastral rent5, which is not covered in the survey. Besides, information on 
specific items of expenditures (e.g. healthcare, house refurbishments, etc.) that are relevant for 
specific tax reliefs, are not available in IT-SILC. Missing information has therefore been imputed, 
drawing from other population-representative surveys covering the subject domains of interest.  
We use the 2010 Survey on Households Income and Wealth released by the Bank of Italy (Bank 
of Italy, 2012), for imputing information on the self-reported asset value6 of the main residence, 
and other immovable properties, used to compute cadastral values. Drawing from the same 
survey, we also impute insurance premiums and house refurbishments expenditures, relevant for 
the computation of specific, and quantitatively important, tax reliefs . Imputation from SHIW has 
been performed using statistical matching techniques, where SHIW individuals have acted as 
‘donors’ of the otherwise missing information for IT-SILC observed ‘recipients’. Matching aims at 
selecting, for each IT-SILC recipient, the SHIW donor that is closest to observational identity, i.e. 
the most similar in terms of characteristics, observed in both surveys that are predictive of the 
variable to be imputed. The quality of the matching procedure relies crucially on a so-called 
                                                 
4 Non-taxable incomes and benefits are taken from the survey, rather than simulated, in order to obtain the 
disposable income measure. 
5 While cadastral income on the main residence is de facto exempted from personal income taxation trough a tax 
deduction, it is anyway relevant for other components of the tax benefit system, such as the means test for family 
benefits. For other properties, according to whether they are rented or left unoccupied, the actual rent received or 
cadastral income are respectively used in tax base assessment. 
6 The SHIW question asks respondents to assess subjectively the value of each of their properties. 
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common support requirement of overlapping in the distribution of predictive characteristics in the 
donors’ and recipients’ samples, which has been empirically tested. The matching procedure we 
have adopted is based on a combination of stratification and Mahalanobis distance nearest 
neighbor algorithm (Rubin, 1980). Matching has been performed at the household level and with 
replacement, that is allowing the same SHIW household to act as donor for multiple IT-SILC 
households, if deemed as the most adequate, rather than being discarded after having served once 
as donor. The donors’ and recipients’ samples have been stratified by main residence 
homeownership, other properties homeownership and geographical area, so that exact matching 
on these variables is ensured; then, within each stratum, the donor household has been selected 
based on the Mahalanobis distance metric, measured on other predictive variables. These include 
equivalent household income, the percentage of household members with more than upper 
secondary educational qualification, a set of household composition dummies, and the main 
earner’s employment status. The quality of matching has been gauged by investigating the balance 
(e.g. in terms of equality in means) in predictive variables between recipients and matched 
donors, and the procedure adjusted as long as achieved balance was deemed unsatisfactory. More 
detail on the implementation of the matching-based imputation, and the achieved balance, is 
reported in Appendix A. 
As a result of the matching-based imputation from SHIW data, information on the asset value of 
owned properties is integrated into IT-SILC. However, for fiscal purposes, properties are valued 
in terms of cadastral rental values. Therefore, we build on existing Land Registry data, which 
provide information on the distribution of properties values and corresponding cadastral incomes 
(separately by gender, by age group, by household composition, by marital status, by geographical 
area and by main residence/secondary property) to derive a measure of cadastral income from 
the available information on properties asset values, integrated into IT-SILC. For assessing the 
cadastral value of the main residence, Land Registry information on the ratio between asset value 
and cadastral income is first of all expanded, using the RAS methodology7, to obtain marginal 
distributions across 300 subgroups, defined in terms of the above mentioned variables. After the 
IT-SILC sample has been correspondingly stratified, the cadastral value for IT-SILC households is 
computed as the ratio between the asset value of the main residence imputed from SHIW, divided 
by the corresponding asset-value-to- cadastral-income ratio8, drawn from the expanded Land 
                                                 
7 The RAS algorithm is an iterative proportional fitting procedure that estimates joint distribution of two or more 
variables given their marginal distributions. See Bacharach, 1965. 
8 More precisely, the ratio has been multiplied by a 1.05 correction factor, to reflect a legislated uprating adjustment.  
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Registry statistics. A similar procedure is followed for imputing the cadastral value of secondary 
properties, where appropriate9.  
As an additional micro-data source, we use the 201310 MULTISCOPO Survey on Health Conditions 
and the Use of Health Services, released by the National Statistical Office (ISTAT, 2014), to 
impute information on healthcare expenditures, necessary to compute other major tax reliefs, 
namely those that involve the largest share of taxpayers. The MULTISCOPO survey has been used 
to estimate, at the individual level, the conditional probability of incurring in tax-relevant 
healthcare expenditures, such as specialists visits, drugs purchases, medical tests and treatments, 
as a function of predictive characteristics observed again both in MULTISCOPO and in IT-SILC. 
These include gender, six age groups, self-assessed health, reported chronic conditions, 
limitations in activities of daily living, geographical regions, marital status, occupation, education, 
presence of dependent children and household size11. 
The estimated parameters have then been used to predict the probability of incurring in health 
expenditures for individuals observed in the IT-SILC sample, based on their characteristics. As 
illustrated in the later section 3.1, the estimated probability of healthcare spending is then flexibly 
used, together with fiscal data on tax reliefs, to identify beneficiaries of healthcare tax reliefs, and 
to impute related expenditure amounts.  
 
3. THE CONSTRUCTION OF BETAMOD 
After the preliminary data adjustments and the imputations, the model has been built through 4 
modules, integrated in an iterative procedure where outer loops (identifying recipients of tax 
expenditures, building calibration weights, computing individual- and income-specific tax evasion 
rates) feed into the inner loop of net-to-gross conversion, as depicted in Figure 1.  
In more detail, based on family and personal characteristics relevant for eligibility, Module 1 
identifies round-specific beneficiaries and expenditure amounts for all of the non-simulated tax 
                                                 
9 When secondary properties are rented, the actual rent received, as collected in IT-SILC, rather than cadastral 
income, enters in the tax base definition.  
10 The MULTISCOPO Survey did not take place in 2010. Even though time distance between the interviews in IT-SILC 
2010 and MULTISCOPO Survey 2013 seems quite large, this does not constitute an issue since we only used qualitative 
information that are actually comparable between the two datasets.  
11 We have not included income among the control variables since the MULTISCOPO Survey does not provide any 
information about it. However, research findings have suggested that, while at aggregate level there exists a positive 
and significant relationship between healthcare expenditure and GDP (Newhouse, 1977), at individual level, there is 
not a significant association between healthcare expenditure and income (especially when the health system provides 
universal coverage free of charge as the Italian healthcare system does). Indeed, full insurance coverage would 
remove the individual budget constraint and reduce or eliminate the influence of cost of care on patients’ decisions 
of how much care to use. Typically, income elasticity of individual healthcare expenditure under full insurance 
coverage regime tends to be near zero (for details see Getzen, 2000).  
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reliefs12, calibrating them to obtain the totals and the income distribution for beneficiaries and 
expenditures resulting from administrative tax returns data. Module 2 deals with the net-to-gross 
income conversion, through a standard iterative algorithm. Once gross and reported income 
measures have been obtained, Module 3 estimates calibration weigths in order to match both 
population totals and administrative taxpayers counts. By comparison of the grossed-up obtained 
income measures with disaggregated administrative tax returns data, Module 4 produces an 
individual tax evasion rate which accounts for the individual’s different income sources 
composition (employment income, pensions, self-employment income13, rental income from 
immovable property), the income level, and geographical residence (North-West, North-East, 
Center, South). After Module 4, round-specific convergence, measured in terms of equality 
between reported incomes as estimated by the model14 and as resulting from official tax returns 
data15 (both at the aggregate level, and by subgroups defined by main source of income and by 
geographical area), is assessed. 
The overall iterative procedure, continues until convergence is achieved. Specifically, the 
iterations stop when the reported levels of income estimated by the model, reflecting estimated 
tax allowances, tax evasion rates and calibration weights, not differ significantly from official tax 
returns data, both at the aggregate level and by subgroups (defined by main source of income and 
geographical area). The overall procedure generates a battery of individual level variables, 
including true gross income, tax evasion rate, reported income, tax relevant expenditures, 
calibration weights, for later use in policy simulation modelling. The following sections provide in 
more detail the four modules and innovative aspects of the model construction.  
 
3.1 Deductions and tax credits module 
In the Italian fiscal system there are different kinds of deductions and tax credits. The most 
sizeable, collectively worth over 5 per cent of GDP, are listed in Table 1, while a comprehensive 
list of tax reliefs, and their quantitative importance, is reported in Tables 6 and 7. 
In terms of design, all deductions and tax credits are non-refundable, with the only exception of 
the tax credit granted to families with four children. Typically, an upper threshold applies to most 
                                                 
12 A comprehensive list of non-simulated tax reliefs, and of the individual and family characteristics used to identify 
the potential beneficiaries is reported in Tables 2 and 3. 
13 We consider as self-employed members of the arts and or professions, sole proprietors, free lances, owners or 
members of a family business and persons receiving profits from non-corporate enterprises. 
14 By ‘reported incomes as estimated by the model’ we mean the portion of true gross income that we estimate the 
individual will declare, given his tax evasion rate. In what follows, this will be referred to as ‘estimated reported 
income’, as opposed to ‘reported income’, which refers to official tax returns data. 
15 The tax returns of the entire population of taxpayers are disposable on the website of the Italian Revenue Agency 
(Ministry of Economy and Finance) only in tabulated form (e.g. by type of income source, by income classes, by area 
of residence, etc.). Additional ad-hoc data were required for better modelling tax reliefs.  
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tax expenditures (mortgage interest payments, rent paid by tenants, education), while the 
healthcare tax credit is allowed on expenses in excess of a lower threshold. Also, a withdrawal 
rate often applies, so that the fiscal benefit is decreasing in individual’s gross income16. 
 
Figure 1 The construction of BETAMOD 
 
 
 
Table 1 The largest PIT deductions and tax credits (fiscal year 2010) 
Description 
Value 
(millions of 
euros) 
Percent 
of GDP 
Deductions    
Social insurance contributions paid by self-employed individuals 17,603 1.13 
Cadastral value of the main residence 8,283 0.53 
Voluntary contributions to private pension plans 1,905 0.12 
Tax credits     
Tax credit for specific income sources 41,887 2.70 
Tax credit for dependent family members 11,375 0.73 
Tax credit for healthcare expenditures 2,585 0.17 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, http://www1.finanze.gov.it/analisi_stat/index.php?tree=2011. 
                                                 
16 The gross income qualified for tax reliefs is net of cadastral income on the main residence.  
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Among deductions, the most relevant in terms of number of recipients and lost revenue, are 
social insurance contributions paid by self-employed individuals17, the cadastral value of the main 
residence and voluntary contributions to private pension plans. Other deductions are granted for 
specific expenditures, including legal alimony payments to spouses, donations to religious 
institutions, personal care services and disability aids for the disabled, and social insurance 
contributions paid for domestic help.  
Among tax credits, the largest single item is a universal tax credit granted for specific income 
sources: the tax credit is applicable for either employment income, or self-employment income, 
or pension income, with a withdrawal rate resulting in a decreasing credit as gross income 
increases. This tax credit contribute to the income tax progressivity design, even more so given 
the absence of a legislated no tax area or legal zero rate tax bracket.  
Another set of tax credits aims at accounting for individual’s ability to pay, given her/his 
household composition (i.e. presence of dependent household members) and her/his children 
characteristics, such as age and disability. These tax credits are decreasing in individual gross 
income and become zero above a certain income threshold. The children tax credit amount and 
income threshold depend also on the number of children, and increase for each child aged three 
years or below and for disabled children. An additional refundable tax relief is granted for 
taxpayers with at least four children. 
Further tax credits are granted for specific expenditures, and amount to the 19 per cent of such 
expenditures: these include mainly healthcare, mortgage interest payments on both the main 
residence and other properties, life insurance premiums, secondary and tertiary education, 
childcare and charitable donations. Finally, a tax credits for up to a maximum of 55 per cent of 
the expenses incurred for energy conservation's interventions and house refurbishments, and a 
lump sum tax credit for rent paid by low-income tenants, are allowed.  
As standard in other tax benefit models for the Italian system, and reflecting data availability 
constraints, BETAMOD fully simulates the deduction for main residence cadastral value, and the 
tax credits by income source and for dependent family members18. However, with respect to 
existing Italian models, which typically impute tax expenditures though calibration with aggregate 
fiscal data by income classes, BETAMOD improves by calibrating not only expenditure amounts, 
but also beneficiaries. In particular, we aim at achieving a more realistic identification of 
beneficiaries, for each specific type of tax expenditure item, based on household and personal 
                                                 
17 Employees’ social contributions are not listed among deductions as they are excluded from taxable employment 
income. 
18 The simulation of tax credit for dependents required the construction of fiscal family that may not coincide with 
the definition of household adopted in IT-SILC. In fact, fiscal family members include the spouse, children and other 
relatives living with the referent person and having a personal gross income (before deductions) below € 2,840. 
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characteristics relevant for eligibility19. Table 2 and Table 3 report the individual and family 
characteristics we used to identify the potential beneficiaries of deductions and tax credits. 
Simulated and non-simulated tax reliefs include all of the current categories provided by tax rules, 
namely, 8 deductions and 30 types of tax credits, these last grouped into 16 main categories. 
Thus, the model offers a complete picture of the wide array of tax reliefs that are part of the 
Italian income tax. 
 
 
Table 2 Deductions: identification of potential beneficiaries 
Deductions Potential beneficiaries Data source 
Social insurance contributions paid by 
self-employed individuals having self-employed income SILC 
Cadastral value of the main residence be the owner's of main residence SILC 
Voluntary contributions to private 
pension plans 
those who reported to pay contributions to 
private pension plan SILC 
Legal alimony payments for spouse those who reported to pay alimony SILC 
Personal care services and disability aids identified by the estimated probability of healthcare spending 
MULTISCOPO 
SILC 
Social insurance contributions paid for 
domestic help 
i) presence of children 
ii) having health care expenses SILC 
Donations to religious institutions  
chosen among taxpayers with the higher 
probability of receiving other tax 
advantages 
SILC 
Others  
chosen among taxpayers with the higher 
probability of receiving other tax 
advantages 
SILC 
 
 
                                                 
19 In practice, for certain tax reliefs, due to lack of information in the data, beneficiaries are mainly identified among 
the taxpayers with the higher probability of receiving other tax advantage; this is motivated by anecdotal evidence 
that the probability of claiming specific tax reliefs increases in the number of other tax reliefs claimed. In order to 
increase variance some beneficiaries have been randomly chosen. 
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Table 3 Tax credits: identification of potential beneficiaries 
 Potential beneficiaries Data source 
19% tax credits   
Healthcare expenses identified by the estimated probability of healthcare spending  MULTISCOPO 
Mortgage interest payments on 
main residence 
i) be the homeowner's of main residence 
ii) have a mortgage loans for the purchase of 
the main residence  
SILC 
Life insurance premium he/she have life insurance expenses SHIW 
Secondary and tertiary education 
i) he/she is studying 
ii) have children attending high school or 
university 
SILC 
Funeral expenses chosen among taxpayers with the higher probability of receiving other tax advantages SILC 
Mortgage interest payments on 
other properties  
i) be the homeowner's of main residence and 
other properties SILC 
Annual enrollment to sports 
facilities 
i) he/she is doing sport 
ii) have children between 6 and 18  SILC 
Rent for resident students 
have children attending university and not 
living within the same residence as the referent 
individual 
SILC 
Social/community/home care 
expenses 
identified by the estimated probability of 
healthcare spending  MULTISCOPO 
Charitable donations chosen among taxpayers with the higher probability of receiving other tax advantages  
Real estate brokerage expenses 
i) be the homeowner's of main residence 
ii) have a mortage loans for the purchase of 
the main residence or others properties 
SILC 
Others chosen among taxpayers with the higher probability of receiving other tax advantages  
55% tax credits   
For energy conservation's 
interventions 
i) be the homeowner's of main residence 
ii) have expenses for energy conservation's 
interventions 
SILC  
SHIW 
41%-36% tax credits   
House refurbishments 
i) be the homeowner's of main residence 
ii) have expenses for the refurbishment of 
buildings 
SILC 
20% tax credits chosen among taxpayers with the higher probability of receiving other tax advantages  
Lump sum tax credit   
For tenants subject to controlled 
rent and for employees relocating 
closer to work 
i) be for rent 
ii) have gross income less than € 30,987.41 
iii) having age between 20 and 30 years old and 
gross income less than € 15,493.71  
SILC 
Security sector tax credit 
i) be employee 
ii) have employment reported income less than 
€ 35,000 
SILC 
Others chosen among taxpayers with the higher probability of receiving other tax advantages  
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Once potential beneficiaries have been identified, calibration of amounts and beneficiaries to 
fiscal data has been carried out for each tax relief type. Calibration accounts not only for income 
classes, as standard in other experiences, but also, building on the availability of additional ad hoc 
data obtained from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, for specific relief beneficiaries 
distribution across occupational status (employee, self-employed and pensioner) and number of 
dependent household members (none, one, two or more). 
Overall, in the light of the importance of tax expenditures in current and future tax reform 
discussion (Burman, 2003 and 2008, MEF, 2011, Poterba, 2011, Tyson, 2014), BETAMOD can be 
used to estimate more accurately the revenue and distributional effects of all tax expenditures 
simultaneously and of specific tax reliefs or categories of expenditure.  
 
3.2 Gross to net conversion module  
To derive gross incomes, we follow a widely used procedure based on an iterative algorithm (see, 
for instance, Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 2001), represented in Figure 2.  
For each taxpayer the procedure estimates an initial true gross income based on an average tax 
rate applied to net income as collected in the survey, then applies an individual tax evasion rate, 
and then simulates the appropriate 2010 tax rules to produce a net income measure20, to be 
compared with the IT-SILC one. 
 If they differ, a new estimate of the true gross income is computed applying a correction factor, 
equal to the ratio between the original and the estimated net income, to the previous round true 
gross income and a new iteration is run. When equality between the two values is achieved (up to 
1 euro of difference), the iteration ends and the data are sent to Module 3 for the reweighting 
procedure. The output for each individual, feeding into the following modules, includes true 
gross income, tax evasion rate, estimated reported income, deductions and tax credits, and gross 
and net income tax liability. 
                                                 
20 In computing individual tax liabilities, deductions are subtracted from reported income, to obtain taxable. The 
gross tax is calculated applying the tax schedule to taxable income. Then net tax is obtained subtracting tax credits 
from gross tax. 
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Figure 2 Net-to- gross conversion (Module 2) 
 
 
 
3.3 Reweighting module  
Calibration weighting is a general technique for adjusting probability-sampling weights as of IT-
SILC so that model estimates are consistent with external official data sources (among others, see 
Atkinson et al., 1988; D’Amuri and Fiorio, 2006). As external data sources, we consider both 
population counts (from ISTAT official statistics) and official fiscal data (MEF). 
While IT-SILC weights are built to match population totals (ISTAT), we adjust them to achieve  
consistency with fiscal data as well, so that the model estimates are reconciled with both the 
entire population and taxpayers counts. The variables used for performing the individual level 
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grossing-up are reported in Table 4. In addition to the standard socio-demographic variables, we 
also consider the number of taxpayers with dependent family members because of the important 
discrepancies between the sample distribution of household composition and official tax returns 
data. We obtain the joint distribution across those variables using the marginal distributions in a 
RAS-like iterative proportional fitting. The household weights are then computed by averaging 
individual household members weights21. As apparent in the last colum of Table 4, the achieved 
difference between BETAMOD recalibrated weights and external official data totals are appealing 
with respect to model estimates representativeness.  
 
Table 4 The grossing-up results  
Variable IT-SILC weight 
Official tax 
returns 
BETAMOD 
weight Difference 
Total Population 60,683,909 - 60,683,909 0 
Males 29,499,829 - 29,499,827 -2 
Females 31,184,080 - 31,184,081 1 
North West 16,131,196 - 16,131,196 0 
North East 11,647,123 - 11,647,123 0 
Center 11,943,354 - 11,943,354 0 
South 20,962,237 - 20,962,237 0 
Age 0 - 14 8,841,850 - 8,841,850 0 
Age 15 - 24 6,041,469 - 6,041,468 -1 
Age 25 - 44 17,172,717 - 17,172,717 0 
Age 45 - 64 16,394,019 - 16,394,019 0 
Age over 65 12,233,854 - 12,233,855 1 
Total households 25,217,462 - 25,217,462 0 
North West 7,186,593 - 7,186,593 0 
North East 4,993,636 - 4,993,636 0 
Center 5,007,637 - 5,007,637 0 
South 8,029,596 - 8,029,596 0 
Total Taxpayers - 41,168,189 41,168,317 128 
Males - 21,622,165 21,622,249 84 
Females - 19,546,024 19,546,068 44 
North West - 11,653,491 11,653,533 42 
North East - 8,710,500 8,710,532 32 
Center - 8,317,613 8,317,638 25 
South - 12,486,585 12,486,613 28 
Reported income classes     
1st quintile - 8,359,593 8,357,026 -2,567 
2nd quintile - 7,753,926 7,754,008 82 
3rd quintile - 10,526,834 10,527,087 253 
4th quintile - 7,851,917 7,852,371 454 
5th quintile - 6,675,919 6,677,825 1,906 
Taxpayers by main income     
  Employment income - 20,228,316 20,228,944 628
Pensions - 14,165,864 14,166,862 998 
Self-employment income - 2,065,737 4,706,768 -1,504 
Rental income from immovable property - 4,708,272 2,065,744 7 
Number of taxpayers with dependent 
family members - 12,624,414 12624454 40 
 
                                                 
21 An appropriate factor of correction is applied to ensure representativeness of households by geographical area. 
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3.4 The tax evasion module  
According to the previous empirical literature concerning tax evasion at micro-level in Italy 
(Bernasconi and Marenzi, 1997; Florio and D’Amuri, 2006), we apply the “discrepancy method” 
to estimate tax evasion rates. The method, based on the assumption that individuals report a 
more truthful income to an anonymous interview than to fiscal authorities, computes tax evasion 
by comparing the tax returns and income survey responses of similar individuals. 
In the above mentioned studies the comparison is made in terms of after-tax income. This choice 
has two main drawbacks. Firstly, it overestimate the tax evasion rates since it computes them as 
the ratio of evaded income on net income, instead of on true gross income. Secondly, when 
taxpayers are compared by quantiles of net incomes, a problem of re-ranking may arise. In fact, 
with respect to the distribution of after-tax income recorded in the survey, tax evasion shifts 
downwards individuals in the distribution of net income in the official data, so that, especially at 
low-income classes, the tax evasion rates are over-estimated. To overcome these drawbacks, 
BETAMOD estimates tax evasion rates as the percentage differences between the true gross 
incomes (as resulting from the net-to-gross conversion module) and the reported incomes 
declared to fiscal authorities. Clearly, since the true gross income is unknown and it is the results 
of the net-to gross procedure, tax evasion may be affected by approximations that depends on 
the estimation method.  
Tax evasion rates are estimated in three steps (see Appendix B). In the first step, aggregate tax 
evasion rates, stratified by area and main income source type, are computed comparing simulated 
true gross incomes with administrative tax data on reported income. As administrative data are 
provided in aggregates, by main income source type and, separately, by geographical area, we first 
apply a RAS technique to obtain the joint distribution of reported income by both dimensions. 
As a result, a 4×4 matrix of average evasion rates, by income type and geographical area, is 
obtained (see Table 9). 
In the second step a distributional income profile of tax evasion is estimated for each area-by-
income type stratum. We refine stratification expanding the 16 strata to account for the profile of 
tax evasion by income classes. In more detail, each area-by-income type stratum is expanded into 
13 classes of true gross income, so that 16 income profiles of tax evasion are obtained. The 
design of each evasion-by-income profile results from an optimizing procedure, which aims at 
minimizing the distance between simulated and administrative reported income. The result is a 
16×13 dimension matrix of tax evasion rates by main income source type, geographical area and 
true gross income level.  
 
 
15 
Finally, a tax evasion rate is assigned to each individual for each type of income source to 
overcome the standard procedure of assigning the same tax evasion rate to all individuals in each 
matrix cell. BETAMOD selects randomly, within each cell, individuals to be identified as tax 
compliers, and those to be identified as tax evaders, then assigns individual tax evasion rates by 
using a beta distribution whose mean value is equal to the average tax evasion rate of the cell. 
Namely, individual tax evasion rates are calibrated so that the sum of individual evaded incomes 
is equal to the total income evaded in the class.  
This represents an advancement, with respect to other models, where tax evasion rates are 
assumed to be constant within population subgroups (e.g. by income source type, by income 
classes). This feature allows assessing the relevance of re-ranking between tax-payers due to the 
presence of tax evasion. 
 
4. VALIDATION AND MAIN RESULTS 
The ability of BETAMOD to reproduce each measure (gross income, taxable income, deductions, 
tax credits and net tax liability) relevant for personal income tax and local income taxes is 
validated through a comparison with official figures provided by tax returns data for the relevant 
fiscal year, that is 2010.  
To do this, we first compare the aggregate tax figures simulated by BETAMOD with the official 
fiscal statistics. Results are shown in Tables 5, 6 and 7. First, it should be noted that tax evasion 
reduces the true gross income of about 61 billions of euro, corresponding to an average tax 
evasion rate of 7.2 per cent (see Table 9). The estimated tax evasion rate might seem relatively 
low in a country, like Italy, where tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon (among others, 
Marino and Zizza, 2012; Fiorio and D’Amuri, 2006 and Murphy, 2012). However, the figure 
reflects the fact that employment income and pensions taken as a whole account for more than 
the 80% of total reported income (53% and 29%, respectively) and that the estimated average tax 
evasion rates for these two types of income are, respectively, 2.9 per cent and zero. 
As apparent in Table 5, BETAMOD output and official fiscal data presents trivial (i.e. lower than 
1%) differences in most figures achieving a very good performance in simulating revenues 
amounts and taxpayers’ counts22. 
The largest difference arises in the number of individuals with positive gross tax liability. This 
seems mostly driven by the model imputation of tax deductions, resulting in a larger number of 
individuals with positive taxable income in BETAMOD. This is because tax deductions have been 
                                                 
22 The regional income tax is simulated by BETAMOD while the municipal income tax is imputed. 
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imputed as a percentage of reported income, thus constraining their amount to be lower than 
reported income, and therefore taxable income to be positive, by construction.  
Focussing on deductions, Table 6 reports the number and the amount of beneficiaries for each 
type.  
 
Table 5 Aggregate validation: main components of personal income tax and local taxes 
 Number of taxpayers
1   Value2 
Totals BETA-
MOD 
Official 
tax returns Diff % 
BETA-
MOD 
Official 
tax returns Diff % 
True gross income 41,168 - - 853,891 - - 
Evaded income 14,778 - - 60,789 - - 
Reported gross income 41,168 41,168 0.0 793,102 792,520 0.1 
Deductions 13,794 13,374 3.1 21,736 21,746 0.0 
Taxable income 41,097 39,894 3.0 763,086 762,185 0.1 
Gross tax 41,097 39,078 5.2 205,213 205,613 -0.2 
Tax credits 39,977 39,088 2.3 64,604 62,482 3.4 
Net tax liability 31,178 30,897 0.9 147,904 149,443 -1.0 
Regional income tax 31,035 30,653 1.2 8,655 8,633 0.3 
Municipal income tax 25,251 25,265 -0.1 3,023 3,021 0.1 
Notes: 1 thousands of persons - 2 millions of euros. 
 
Table 6 Aggregate validation: deductions 
 Number of taxpayers1 Value2 
Deductions BETA-
MOD 
Official 
tax 
returns 
Diff % BETA-
MOD 
Official 
tax 
returns 
Diff % 
Social insurance contributions paid 
by self-employed individuals 11,922 11,991 -0.6 17,601 17,603 0.0 
Cadastral value of the main 
residence 16,873 17,166 -1.7 8,279 8,283 0.0 
Voluntary contributions to private 
pension plans 803 822 -2.3 1,897 1,905 -0.4 
Legal alimony payments for 
spouse 109 120 -9.5 742 745 -0.4 
Personal care services and 
disability aids 147 143 2.8 537 531 1.2 
Social insurance contributions paid 
for domestic help 522 537 -2.8 415 419 -0.9 
Donations to religious institutions  95 104 -8.7 27 27 -1.8 
Others  1,800 1,816 -0.9 517 516 0.1 
Notes: 1 thousands of persons- 2 millions of euros. 
 
Again, no significant differences are found between BETAMOD results and tax returns data, in 
particular, BETAMOD replicates well the largest deduction (the social insurance contributions). 
 
17 
Some discrepancies can be observed only in simulating the number of deduction beneficiaries for 
donations to religious institutions (-8.7%) and for alimony payments to the spouse (-9.5%). In 
both cases the number of tax relief claimants is anyway negligible. 
Table 7 considers tax credits, covering both the model-simulated and the imputed ones. In 
general, BETAMOD estimates provide a good approximation of the tax returns figures.  
 
 
Table 7 Aggregate validation: tax credits 
 Number of beneficiares1 Value2 
Tax credit BETA-MOD 
Official 
tax 
returns 
Diff % BETA-MOD 
Official 
tax 
returns 
Diff % 
Income source tax credit 37,852 36,426 3.9 44,475 41,887 6.2 
Dependent family members tax 
credit 12,624 12,624 0.0 10,914 11,375 -4.0 
19% tax credits           Healthcare expenses 14,855 15,002 -1.0 2,588 2,585 0.1 
Mortgage interest payments on 
main residence 3,817 3,841 -0.6 1,146 1,147 0.0 
Life insurance premium 6,437 6,520 -1.3 750 751 -0.1 
Secondary and tertiary education 2,102 2,095 0.3 318 318 0.0 
Funeral expenses 413 428 -3.6 119 119 -0.4 
Mortgage interest payments on 
other properties  281 296 -5.1 80 77 3.2 
Annual enrollment to sports 
facilities 1,506 1,522 -1.1 60 60 0.1 
Rent for resident students 159 169 -6.2 51 50 1.0 
Social/community/home care 
expenses 113 108 4.0 38 38 0.6 
Charitable donations 899 915 -1.8 36 36 0.3 
Real estate brokerage expenses 95 100 -4.1 16 15 1.5 
Others 1,080 1,101 -1.9 83 83 -0.1 
55% tax credits           For energy conservation's 
interventions  1,038 1,052 -1.4 1,351 1,349 0.1 
41%-36% tax credits       House refurbishments 5,175 5,267 -1.8 2,242 2,243 0.0 
20% tax credit  539 540 -0.1 65 65 -0.1 
Others tax credits         For tenants subject to controlled 
rent and for employees relocating 
closer to work 
708 713 -0.7 138 136 1.5 
Security sector tax credit 375 349 7.5 50 50 0.0 
Others 158 137 15.3 84 83 1.6 
Notes: 1 thousands of persons- 2 millions of euros. 
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The number of beneficiaries and the amount of the income-source tax credit are overestimated 
of about 3.9% and 6.2% respectively. This is mainly due to the fact that estimated reported 
incomes are more dense in the bottom of the distribution in BETAMOD than in tax data. Since the 
tax credit is decreasing in income, the BETAMOD tax credit results greater than in tax returns data. 
As to the dependent family members tax credit, the striking similarity in the number of 
beneficiaries is motivated by this variable having been taken into account in the weighting design, 
while the simulated amount of tax credit is -4.0% lower than the official figure, presumably 
reflecting the sample distribution of household composition, relevant for identification of 
dependants. The other most sizeable tax credits, namely healthcare expenditures23, house 
refurbishment, energy interventions and mortgage interest tax credits are remarkably close to the 
administrative figures. As expected, the main discrepancies arise in the numbers of beneficiaries 
of the less sizeable tax credits24. 
Besides assessing the model validity at the aggregate level, no less attention should be devoted to 
the validation of the distributional patterns of different components of the model output, as it 
mainly represents a tool for carrying out distributional analyses. First, we compare the 
distribution of taxpayers (Figure 3) and of simulated reported income (Figure 4) with official 
statistics. Overall, the BETAMOD distributions are strikingly similar to the fiscal data ones, 
especially in the classes of reported income where most of taxpayers fall (12-26 thousands of 
euros). Such pattern of similarity is confirmed when considering the distribution of average gross 
and net tax liabilities across income classes (Table 8). 
The following Figures 5 and 6 represent the progressive design of the income source and the 
family dependents tax credits, as arising from BETAMOD and from tax returns data. Again, the 
similarity between the two is striking, and is also confirmed for other tax allowances (the related 
figures are reported in Appendix C). Interestingly, both tax credits are partly lost by taxpayers in 
the bottom income class, due to their low level of taxable income/gross tax liability, and to the 
non-refundable nature of these tax credits.  
As evidenced in previous Tables 6 and 7, tax deductions and tax credits subsidize personal 
spending on a wide range of goods and services, including housing, healthcare and education. 
Some preliminary information on the model assessment of the redistributive impact of those tax 
reliefs that substitute direct expenditures25 is provided in Table 9. Were tax expenditures 
abolished, state and local tax revenue would be raised by 15,100 millions of euros (+10% with 
                                                 
23 Among tax credits granted for specific expenditures, healthcare expenditures represents about the 49%.  
24 Simulating the correct number of beneficiaries in the quantitatively less important tax credits is, in fact, one of the 
most common challenges in microsimulation modelling due to the lack of information relevant for identification of 
potential claimants in the survey data, as well as to the small number of individuals involved. 
25 For the exercise we consider all tax reliefs excluding income source and dependent family members tax credits. 
 
19 
respect to the baseline simulation) and inequality indexes reduced of about 0.35%. Although the 
“revenue method” does not account for taxpayers’ behavior (see, Burman et al., 2008), deductions 
and tax credits appear to generate a more unequal distribution of households’ equivalent 
disposable income26. 
 
 
Figure 3 Distribution of taxpayers by classes of reported income 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 We compute household’s disposable income by adding all true gross income earned by the family members ad 
subtracting the personal tax liabilities. The household equivalent income is obtained by applying the OECD-modified 
equivalence scales. 
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Figure 4 Distribution of reported income by classes of reported income 
 
 
 
Table 8 Gross and net tax distribution by income classes (mean values in euros) 
Classes of reported income 
(euros) 
Gross tax Net tax 
BETAMOD Official tax returns  BETAMOD 
Official tax 
returns  
0 – 5,000 442 453 281 229 
5,000 -   7,500 1,317 1,394 613 460 
7,500 -  10,000 1,851 1,938 415 492 
10,000 -  12,000 2,437 2,417 826 867 
12,000 -  15,000 2,998 2,993 1,384 1,426 
15,000 -  20,000 4,005 3,988 2,373 2,336 
20,000 -  26,000 5,363 5,359 3,745 3,673 
26,000 -  29,000 6,612 6,584 5,026 4,952 
29,000 -  35,000 7,979 7,966 6,403 6,401 
35,000 -  40,000 10,077 9,962 8,763 8,513 
40,000 -  50,000 12,634 12,439 11,452 11,169 
50,000 -  75,000 18,111 18,244 17,134 17,228 
above 75,000 45,707 46,799 44,166 45,551 
Average 4,993 5,262 4,744 4,837 
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Figure 5 Income source tax credit as a proportion of reported income (%) 
 
 
Figure 6 Tax credit for dependent family members as a proportion of reported income (%) 
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Table 9 Effect on inequality of tax expenditures  
Tax law 2010   
Gini index 32.55%  
Atkinson index 18.35%  
Removal of deductions  Variation 
Gini index 32.32%  -0.23% 
Atkinson index 18.14% -0.20% 
Removal of tax credits  Variation 
Gini index 32.40%  -0.15% 
Atkinson index 18.20% -0.14% 
Removal of both deductions and tax credits  Variation 
Gini index 32.17%  -0.38% 
Atkinson index 17.99% -0.35% 
 
 
5. Tax evasion and its distributional profile  
To showcase BETAMOD potential for analysis, in this section we provide some distributional 
evidence on tax evasion. According to our estimates, on aggregate €61 billions of gross income 
escape tax authorities, corresponding to a tax revenue loss amounting to about €16 billions27. 
Unsurprisingly, tax evasion arises mostly from self-employed income and, to a lesser extent, 
rental income from property: overall, 85% of evaded income is attributable to these two sources 
(65% and 20% respectively). The remaining 15% of evaded income is attributable to employment 
income, as pension income, representing a public transfer, can hardly be hidden from tax 
authorities.  
Average tax evasion rates, by income source and geographical area, are reported in Table 10. The 
figures reveal that tax evasion on employment income, while not negligible, is low (2.9%), and 
that the largest tax evasion rates are registered on rental income from immovable property 
(33.6%) and self-employment income (24%). Relevant differences arise also between 
geographical areas: in particular, our results identify individuals living in the South of Italy as 
those displaying systematically higher tax evasion rate, followed by those in the North East. The 
BETAMOD estimated average values are slightly lower, yet not inconsistent, with estimates derived 
by above mentioned studies on tax evasion in Italy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 The tax revenue loss refers to the personal income tax (15 billions), regional and municipal additional income taxes 
(800 and 160 millions respectively). 
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Table 10 Average tax evasion rates by income source and geographical area (%) 
Average tax evasion rate NW NE C S Italy 
Employment income  2.7 3.1 2.8 3.3 2.9 
Pensions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Self-employment income 22.2 25.1 22.3 27.2 24.0 
Rental income from immovable property 30.6 35.5 31.3 38.2 33.6 
Total income 6.9 7.5 6.8 7.7 7.2 
 
As arises from Figure 7 (a,b,c), the distribution of tax evasion rates varies across different income 
sources. Among individuals who hide employment income from tax authorities, low tax evasion 
rates are most often estimated. On the contrary, more than half of self-employed income tax 
evaders display a tax evasion rate that is higher than 60%. A similar distribution arises for rental 
income evasion; about 50% of rental income tax evaders display tax evasion rates between 60 and 
80%.  Figure 7d plots the full distribution of estimated individual tax evasion rates, by true gross 
income, i.e. the ‘true’ amount individuals would report to tax authorities under full compliance.  
The Figure reveals that individuals’ tax evasion rates cluster around an upper and a lower level, 
reflecting the underlying individual income sources composition, i.e. the prevalence of 
employment (relatively low level of tax evasion) versus self-employed and rental incomes (high 
level of tax evasion). The evidently negative gross income gradient of tax evasion rates clearly 
reflects the tax evasion estimation procedure, which accounts for evasion-by-income profiles28. 
The following Figure 8, where tax evasion rates by income class are shown, provides further 
evidence on the negative gross income gradient of tax evasion rates, and allows to better gauge 
the income profile of tax evasion behaviour by income source as well. In relative terms, both for 
each income source, and for their aggregate, consistently with previous studies, BETAMOD 
reflects tax evasion rates generally decreasing in income29 (although to a much lesser extent in the 
lowest income classes, with respect to other classes).  
 
                                                 
28 As previously explained in section 3.4, the decreasing aggregate profile results by the comparison 
between BETAMOD simulated gross income and reported income to tax authorities.  
29 Results must be considered taking into account that they are based on the income distribution which directly 
emerges from IT-SILC survey. However, the survey doesn’t guarantee representation of true income distribution. 
Previous studies, although based on Bank of Italy’s survey (e.g. Cannari and D’Alessio, 1992) have in particular 
identified two major biases, which are indeed common to surveys conducted in other countries. The first is the 
selectivity bias due to the fact that not all families are equally available to participate to the survey; the second is 
known as under-reporting, and arises when the respondent reports a disposable income below the true income. Both 
selectivity bias and under-reporting can explained with the fear that some people have that their files could be 
accessed by the tax authorities. Evidence indicates that the fear is more pronounced in individuals belonging to the 
upper tail of the distribution. A third, though less relevant, bias is originated by some over-reporting of people 
belonging in the lower tail. Clearly all three biases contribute to making the sample distribution less unequal than the 
real distribution. 
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Figure 7 Distribution of tax evasion rates by type of income (tax evaders only, in percentage) 
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Figure 8 Average tax evasion rates by type of income and by true gross income classes 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the total amount of unreported income. It can be noticed that, despite the 
decreasing profile of tax evasion rates, most of evaded income is due to taxpayers with gross 
income in the range 12,000-50,000 euro, and mainly to self-employed income. 
Tax evasion, by reducing reported income, causes a relevant downward shift in the distribution of 
taxpayers by reported income, with respect to that by (true) gross income. To begin with, tax 
evasion may modify the relative position (in terms of reported income) between fully-compliant 
taxpayers and same-true-gross-income evaders, generating an horizontal inequity effect in income 
taxation. Indeed, while horizontal inequity is one of the major consequence of tax evasion, very 
little studies measuring it exist.  
BETAMOD evidence is provided in Figure 10, where the two cumulative distributions of 
taxpayers, by (true) gross and reported income respectively, are shown. The distribution of 
individuals by reported income is thicker in the left tail, when compared with the distribution of 
gross income, suggesting a downward movement, along the income distribution, of taxpayers 
who “benefit” from tax evasion.  
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Figure 9 Unreported income by classes of true gross income (millions of euros) 
 
 
Figure 10 Cumulative distributions of taxpayers by (true) gross and reported income 
classes
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BETAMOD transition matrix, reporting the share of true gross income taxpayers falling in each 
income class, found in different reported income classes as a result of tax evasion, is reported in 
Table 11. As a result of non-compliance, the taxpayers in the bottom income class, for instance, 
moves from about 10% when considering true gross income to about 14% when considering 
reported income relevant for taxation. Evaders who enter the bottom income class come from 
the 2nd to the 8th income class (up to 29 thousands of euros), rather than from higher income 
classes, reflecting the decreasing income profile of tax evasion rates. Moving to the upper classes, 
we observe a similar pattern of shifts across income classes, although the number of shifts is 
progressively reduced, again because of the negative income gradient in tax evasion. While Table 
10 only reports between class shifts, building on the availability of individual tax evasion rates, 
BETAMOD allows to detect further shifts happening within each income class.  
Once taxation applies to reported income, shifts along the income distribution, give rise not only 
to horizontal inequities, but also to a re-ranking effect, with a reversal of taxpayers’ relative 
positions before (i.e. reflecting the true gross income position) and after personal income taxation 
( i.e. based on the reported income position ), which the model also allows studying. Although 
preliminary, the novel empirical evidence showcased here bears major implications for the 
accurate measurement of the actual redistributive effect of personal income taxation and its 
decomposition in the horizontal, vertical and re-ranking effect, each of which is possibly altered 
by tax evasion. 
 
Table 11 Transition matrix of taxpayers from (true) gross income to reported income (%) 
 
 Classes of true gross income 
 0-5 5-7.5 7.5-10 10-12 12-15 15-20 20-26 26-29 29-35 35-40 45-50 50-75 > 75 Total 
Cl
as
se
s o
f r
ee
po
rte
d 
in
co
m
e 0-5 10.47 1.51 0.79 0.33 0.57 0.33 0.11 0.01      14.11 
5-7.5  6.37 0.91 0.43 0.42 0.52 0.32 0.07 0.04     9.08 
7.5-10   7.13 0.60 0.49 0.34 0.39 0.11 0.08 0.02    9.15 
10-12    4.38 0.71 0.50 0.25 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.01   6.06 
12-15     7.66 1.25 0.31 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.04   9.61 
15-20      14.26 1.64 0.24 0.19 0.09 0.05   16.5 
20-26       13.43 0.72 0.43 0.12 0.11 0.01  14.82 
26-29        4.06 0.51 0.12 0.08 0.01  4.78 
29-35         5.34 0.37 0.23 0.06  6.01 
35-40          2.38 0.31 0.05  2.75 
40-50           2.64 0.30  2.94 
50-75            2.25 0.02 2.26 
> 75             1.95 1.95 
Total 10.47 7.88 8.83 5.74 9.85 17.21 16.45 5.36 6.86 3.23 3.48 2.67 1.96 100 
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Appendix A - Statistical matching between the IT-SILC and SHIW datasets 
We describe here how the statistical matching between the IT-SILC dataset with the Bank of 
Italy's Survey on Households Income and Wealth (SHIW) at the household level was performed. 
First, two constraints need be satisfied to make matching feasible: (i) the two surveys must be 
random samples from the same population; (ii) there must be a common set of conditioning 
variables. In our case, the first condition is met by design, since both the IT-SILC 2011 and the 
SHIW 2012 data are representative of the Italian population. As far as the second constraint is 
concerned, the variables (X) common to each dataset and chosen for the process of imputation 
of self-reported asset value of the main residence, insurance premiums and house refurbishments 
expenditures are: equivalent household income, the percentage of household members with more 
than upper secondary educational qualification, a set of household composition dummies, and 
the main earner’s employment status. The final sample is made up of 7.951 households from the 
SHIW survey and 19.399 households from the IT-SILC Survey. 
The dataset, integrated by IT-SILC -Bank of Italy was created using the Mahalanobis Distance 
Matching Method (MDMM), a statistical method which allows individuals with similar 
characteristics but from different datasets to be paired (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).  In order 
to obtain a more precise matching, the sample was stratified in cells according to the main 
residence homeownership, other properties homeownership and geographical area so that exact 
matching on these variables is ensured; then, within each stratum, the donor household has been 
selected based on the Mahalanobis distance metric, measured on the other X variables. 
The Mahalanobis metric is a measure of dissimilarity between observation which measures the 
distance between units i from the recipient dataset IT-SILC  and j from the donor dataset SHIW 
weighting each coordinate of X in inverse proportion to the variance of that coordinate: 
)()(),( 1 ′−Σ−= − jiji xxxxjid  
Where Σ  is the variance–covariance matrix of X.  
Matching has been performed at the household level and with replacement, that is allowing the 
same SHIW household to act as donor for multiple IT-SILC households, if deemed as the most 
adequate, rather than being discarded after having served once as donor. 
Once the matching procedure was complete, we check the quality of the matching. The quality of 
matching was evaluated in terms of maintaining the asset value of the main residence, insurance 
premiums and house refurbishments expenditures distributions, both in terms of preserving the 
pre-existing variables distribution as well as in terms of pre-existing relations between variables of 
interest. The next step was i) the comparison between the asset value of the main residence, 
insurance premiums and house refurbishments expenditures distributions in the integrated 
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dataset and the pre-existing SHIW one, ii) the calculation of the correlation between asset value of 
the main residence, insurance premiums and house refurbishments expenditures distributions 
and the X vector to verify the maintenance of the sign recorded in the "donor set". The 
differences between the common-fusion correlations in the SHIW data set versus the fused IT-
SILC data set were well preserved for most variables. For the sake of brevity, tables showing 
distributions and correlations are not included but they are available on request. 
Finally, the quality of the matching has been evaluated in terms of “balancing test”: we compared 
the mean covariate values in the recipients and matched donors i.e. each of the observable 
covariates within the recipients has the same average value within the matched donors. Before 
matching we expect differences, after matching the variables should be balanced in both groups 
and significant differences should not persist.  
The covariate balancing test, included in Table A1, shows that the matching is effective in 
removing differences in observable characteristics between the recipients and matched donors. In 
particular, the median absolute bias is reduced by approximately 82%-98%. The Pseudo R-
squared after matching is always close to zero, correctly suggesting that the covariates have no 
explanatory power in the matched samples. The chi-square test conducted before and after 
matching, proves that the propensity score removed bias due to differences in covariates between 
the recipients and matched donors.  
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Table A.1 Balancing Test 
Property Region       
1st 2nd N-O N-E C S Sample Pseudo R2 
LR 
test 
p- 
values 
Median 
Bias 
% 
reduction 
in median 
bias 
!  ! !   
Before matching 0.013 99.72 0.000 6.4 
0.969 
After matching 0.000 0.38 0.996 0.2 
!    !  
Before matching 0.012 42.77 0.000 5.0 
0.980 
After matching 0.000 1.23 0.942 0.1 
!     ! 
Before matching 0.019 102.27 0.000 5.8 
0.931 
After matching 0.000 1.30 0.935 0.4 
! ! !    
Before matching 0.007 11.84 0.037 6.7 
0.955 
After matching 0.000 0.07 1.000 0.3 
! !  !   
Before matching 0.001 2.50 0.776 4.2 
0.929 
After matching 0.001 2.27 0.810 0.3 
! !   !  
Before matching 0.007 14.36 0.013 6.0 
0.933 
After matching 0.000 0.20 0.999 0.4 
! !    ! 
Before matching 0.004 9.31 0.097 7.0 
0.971 
After matching 0.000 0.63 0.987 0.2 
 ! ! ! ! ! 
Before matching 0.004 4.14 0.529 4.6 
0.824 
After matching 0.001 1.46 0.917 0.8 
  ! !   
Before matching 0.042 136.58 0.000 6.1 
0.984 
After matching 0.000 1.95 0.857 0.1 
    ! ! 
Before matching 0.029 122.41 0.000 10.0 
0.980 
After matching 0.000 0.51 0.992 0.2 
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Appendix B – Estimation of tax evasion rates 
B.1 Tax evasion rates by income source type and geographical area 
From official tax returns data (from MEF) we know the total amount of reported income and the 
number of taxpayers by main income source type ( 4,...,1=i ) and, separately, by geographical 
area, ( 4,...,1=j ). From the BETAMOD simulated true gross incomes we compute the total 
amount of reported income and the number of taxpayers for the same characteristics. 
Then, it is possible to compute two sets of average tax evasion rates by main source of income i: 
[B.1] S
i
MEFS
i
S
iS
i y
yy
e
−
=  
and by geographical area j: 
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A
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−
=  
To convert the tax evasion rates by main income source type of taxpayers ( Sie ) into rates referred 
to types of income received ( Aje ), we use the BETAMOD estimated true gross incomes to build a 
4×4 matrix B, in which each element is total amount of true gross income of type i ( 4,...,1=i ) 
received by taxpayers with main source of income type i ( 4,...,1=i ). The total amount of 
unreported income by main source of income type i is computed as: 
[B.3] ( ) SiMEFSiSiSi NyyU −=  
where SiN  is the number of taxpayers with main source of income type i. 
With this information it is possible to compute the tax evasion rates by income source by solving 
the linear system: 
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so ( ) UBeeeee RSELFRIMMRPENSREMPR 1,,, −== . 
The amount of unreported income by source type is: 
[B.5] Ri
R
i
R
i YeU =  
and RiY  is the total amount of type i’s received income. The amount of unreported income by 
geographical area is instead: 
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[B.6] Aj
A
j
A
j YeU =  
and AjY  is the total amount of area j’s received income.  
From the BETAMOD simulated true gross incomes we compute the total amount of individual 
incomes by main income source type ( 4,...,1=i ) and by geographical area, ( 4,...,1=j ), obtaining 
the 4×4 matrix { }ijyY = . 
By using matrix Y and the marginal distribution of unreported income by source type, RU , and 
by geographical area, AU , with the use of the RAS technique we first obtain the joint 
distributions of total unreported income by income source and by area, { }ijuU = , and, secondly, 
the 4×4 matrix of average tax evasion rates, { }ijee = , by source type of received income and by 
geographical area: 
[B.7] 
ij
ij
ij y
ue =  
The matrix e  is shown in Table 9. 
 
B.2 Tax evasion profiles by classes of true gross income 
Each average tax evasion rate ije  is then modulated in order to obtain a profile of tax evasion by 
classes of true gross income, i.e. a vector of tax evasion rates associated with 13 income classes 
(see Table 8). 
Define ijke  as the average tax evasion rate for income class k, source type i and area j with the 
following function: 
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where: 
ijky  = mean gross true of class k, source type i and area j; 
ijy  = mean gross true of source type i and area j; 
ije  = average tax evasion rate for source type i and area j; 
and the parameters to estimate are: 
e
ik  determines the ordinate intercept; 
y
ik  determines the level of income for which ijijk ee = ; 
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iz  determines the curvature of the function. 
 
With this formulation we need to estimate 12 parameters: eik , yik , iz  with 4,...,1=i . As we 
assume that pensions cannot be concealed, the number of parameters reduces to 9. The method 
used by BETAMOD is a procedure of numeric optimization that assigns randomly the value of the 
9 parameters and choose the best combination that minimize the distance function 
[B.9] ∑ −= k BETAMODkMEFk YYD  
where MEFkY  and BETAMODkY  are respectively the official returns and the BETAMOD total amount of 
reported income by classes. 
The profiles obtained are shown in Figure 8. 
 
B.3 Assignment of individual tax evasion rates 
The average tax evasion rate ijke  (for the i-th income source type, the j-th geographical area and 
the k-th class of true gross income) is defined as the ratio between the unreported income ijkU  
and the true income ijkY  of the cell: 
[B.10] 
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And can be seen as the product: 
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where: 
ijkEY  is the total amount of tax evaders’ income in cell i,j,k 
ijkE
ijk
ijkE Y
Ue =  is the average tax evasion of tax evaders in cell i,j,k 
ijk
ijkE
ijkY Y
YH =  is the share of tax evaders income in cell i,j,k 
The values of ijkEe  and ijkYH  are unknown, but we know their product ijke  and their maximum 
value (i.e. 100%). In the absence of further information, we assume that the two values are equal, 
so: 
[B.12] ijkEijkEijkY eeH ==  
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For instance, if the average tax evasion rate in a cell is 0.25, then we assume that 
%5025.0 === ijkEijkY eH , i.e. tax evaders own the 50% of the true gross income in the cell 
and that their tax evasion rate is 50%.  
To assign individual tax evasion in BETAMOD we proceed in the following way: 
1. for each value ijke  we compute the two values ijkEe  and ijkYH ; 
2. we randomly assign a probability to be a tax evader to each taxpayer in the sample (by 
means of a uniform distribution) and we order taxpayers in decreasing order of 
probability; 
3. starting with the taxpayer with the highest probability, we assign a random tax evasion 
rate drawn from a beta distribution with mean ijkEe  and a standard error varying with the 
mean; 
4. we proceed to assign tax evasion rates to taxpayer with lesser probability until we reach 
the total amount of unreported income of the cell ijkU . 
The beta distribution used to assign a tax evasion rate tijke  to the income of source type i of the 
taxpayer t with characteristics j,k is then 







−
θ
θ ,1~ ijkE
ijkE
tijk e
ebetae . This beta distribution has 
expected value equal to ijkEtijk eeE =)(  and standard deviation equal to 
ijkE
ijkEijkE
tijk ek
eeesd
−+
−
= 1
)1()(
2
. 
The standard deviation is close to zero when there is no tax evasion ( 0=ijkEe ) or when all 
income is concealed ( 1=ijkEe ), and is negatively correlated with the parameter θ . We assigned 
to θ  a value of 5 in order to obtain a maximum value of the standard deviation approximatively 
equal to 1/6 when the average tax evasion rate is about 1/3 (see figure below). 
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Appendix C – Incidence of tax reliefs on reported income 
 
Figure C.1 Total tax deductions as a proportion of reported income (%) 
 
 
 
Figure C.2 The 19% tax credits as a proportion of reported income (%) 
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Figure C.3 Social insurance contributions paid by self-employed individuals as a proportion of 
reported income (%) 
 
 
 
Figure C.4 The 19% tax credit for healthcare expenses as a proportion of reported income (%) 
 
 
